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Abstract 
In a micro-founded framework in line with the new open economy 
macroeconomics, the paper shows that the monetary policies of the 
domestic and foreign CB are strategic complements and the presence 
of an inflation-averse central bank (CB) abroad always increases 
employment in the home country. We demonstrate that a centralized 
wage setting and CB conservatism curb unemployment only if labor 
market distortions are sizeable. When labor distortions are sufficiently 
low, employment may be maximized by atomistic wage setters or a 
populist CB. Finally, the welfare analysis reveals that a nationally 
centralized wage bargaining system always maximizes welfare if 
monopoly distortions in the labor market are relevant, while the 
appointment of a populist CB or completely decentralized wage 
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In a micro-founded framework in line with the new open economy
macroeconomics, the paper shows that the monetary policies of the do-
mestic and foreign CB are strategic complements and the presence of an
inﬂation-averse central bank (CB) abroad always increases employment
in the home country. We demonstrate that a centralized wage setting and
CB conservatism curb unemployment only if labor market distortions are
sizeable. When labor distortions are suﬃciently low, employment may be
maximized by atomistic wage setters or a populist CB. Finally, the wel-
fare analysis reveals that a nationally centralized wage bargaining system
always maximizes welfare if monopoly distortions in the labor market are
relevant, while the appointment of a populist CB or completely decentral-
ized wage setting is optimal when monopoly distortions are not sizeable.
JEL classiﬁcation: E2, E42, E5, F31, F41
Keywords: Central bank conservatism, centralization of wage setting,
inﬂationary bias.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The creation of the European Monetary Union has signiﬁcantly changed the
institutional framework in which economic agents operate. In Coricelli et al.
(2004), for instance, the formation of the monetary union (MU) is shown to
have a twofold eﬀect: on the one hand, it reduces the size of each ﬁrm and on
the other hand it increases the degree of competition in product markets and
consequently in the labor market. The ﬁrst eﬀect encourages wage aggressive-
ness and hence unemployment and inﬂation1. The second eﬀect, on the contrary,
dampens wage demands and stimulates employment. In this respect, a larger
competition implies that for an increase in the wage demanded the unemploy-
ment consequences among union’s members are greater. By the same token,
a more conservative central bank (CB) reacts to wage claims by reducing its
money supply and further boosting unemployment. It then follows that, with
∗University of Siena; e-mail: cuciniello@unisi.it
1In a siminal vein, a larger number of unions due to the formation of a MU entails that
each union internalizes a smaller fraction of their inﬂationary wage settlement (Cukierman
and Lippi, 2001).
1non atomistic wage setters, the threat of unemployment provoked by a conser-
vative CB curbs wage aggressiveness and consequently stimulates employment
in the MU.
Most of the papers in the policy games literature assume a closed-economy
framework2 or a MU in which the member countries do not trade and are only
linked through a common CB (e.g. Cukierman and Lippi, 2001; Soskice and
Iversen, 1998; Grüner and Hefeker, 1999). Nevertheless the hypothesis that
changes in the price level abroad do not have an impact on the home country via
competitiveness or consumption wage eﬀects but only indirectly via the reaction
of the common CB is clearly an unrealistic scenario. When open economy
aspects are taken into account the results derived in the recent literature on
strategic institutional interactions are not generally robust.
Now when countries trade each other new issues arise from the strategic
interactions among home and foreign CBs and home and foreign labor unions.
This paper aims to investigate how strategic interactions between national mon-
etary policies of two countries inﬂuence the wage setting behavior of labor unions
and it contributes with a study on the long run economic consequences on the
welfare.
We use a general-equilibrium model of two countries, diﬀerent in size and la-
bor market institutions, characterized by monopolistic competition in the prod-
uct market and unionized labor markets. In a micro-founded framework in line
with the new open economy macroeconomics, we show that under a ﬂoating
regime the presence of an inﬂation averse foreign CB always increases employ-
ment in the home country. Moreover we challenge the main idea that a conser-
vative domestic CB can always reduce unemployment at country level (Coricelli
et al. 2004). We demonstrate that a more conservative CB and centralization of
wage setting reduce unemployment only if labor market distortions are sizeable.
However, a fully centralized wage bargaining system always maximizes welfare.
When conversely labor distortions are suﬃciently low, employment and welfare
may be maximized by atomistic wage setters or a populist CB.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the model under
a ﬂexible exchange rate regime. Section 3-6 compute the optimal strategy of
each player. Section 7 analyzes the eﬀects of the number of unions and CBC on
employment and inﬂation in the two countries. Section 8 presents the conclu-
sions.
2E c o n o m i c S e t u p
In this section we develop a general equilibrium model in a micro-founded frame-
work. The economy comprises two countries, indexed H (home) and F (foreign),
w h o s er e l a t i v es i z ei sγ and 1 −γ, respectively. The domestic country is inhab-
ited by a continuum of symmetric agents j ∈ (0,γ), while j∗ ∈ (γ,1) agents
settle in the foreign country3.
The countries trade two types of goods but each country is specialized in the
production of only one type. Each traded good can, in turn, be manufactured
2Among others Coricelli et al. (2000), Cubitt (1992; 1995), Guzzo and Velasco (1999),
Lippi (1999), Skott (1997).
3Throughout the paper foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk.
2by a continuum of monopolistic competitive ﬁrms in a variety of brands indexed
by z.
Labor is the only factor of production and is diﬀerentiated in a variety of
types deﬁned in the continuous interval (0,1). All workers are unionized and
distributed equally among trade unions. Each agent supplies a diﬀerentiated
labor type and, for a given wage, is willing to provide whatever quantity of
labor is required to clear the market.
Each country has its own CB that is appointed to conduct the national
monetary policy independently and non-cooperatively with the other CB.
A three-stage game is considered. In the ﬁrst stage unions choose the growth
rate of the nominal wages of their members simultaneously. In the second stage
the CBs choose the growth of rate of money supply simultaneously in the two
countries. In the third stage the ﬁrms set their own price. The game is then
solved by backward induction.
2.1 Supply side
The world economy is inhabited by a continuum of monopolistic competitive
ﬁrms, indexed by z ∈ (0,1),e a c hp r o d u c i n gad i ﬀerentiated brand. For con-
venience domestic ﬁrms are placed in the contiguous subinterval [0,γ] of the
unit interval, while foreign ﬁrms lie on the subinterval [γ,1].E a c hﬁrm uses a










, 0 <α<1,σ> 1
where Y (z) is the output of the brand z p r o d u c e di nt h eh o m ec o u n t r y ,Li(z)
is the labor type i supplied by the worker represented by union i, σ is the
elasticity of substitution among labor types and α is representing the return
to scale parameter. Firms are assumed to have market power in the product
market but not in the labor market so that they take wages as given. Cost


















is the aggregate wage deﬁned as the minimal nominal cost of producing a unit
of output z i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r y .
2.2 Preferences
Each agent consumes a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods and supplies a diﬀeren-
tiated labor type. The utilities of agents j and j∗ are deﬁned over consumption
and hours worked as follows:










where k is a preference parameter4. Cj and Cj∗ are the consumption index of













γγ(1 − γ)1−γ .
The consumption index of home (foreign) agent j (j∗) consists of two baskets,
one of the home-produced good, Cj,H (Cj∗,H), and one of the foreign-produced
good, Cj,F (Cj∗,F). The basket of the home- and foreign-produced good are in

























where Cj,H(z) (Cj,F(z))i st h ejth individual’s consumption of brand z produced
i nt h eh o m e( f o r e i g n )c o u n t r y ,a n dλ>1.5 Similar consumption indices of brand
z hold for j∗th individual abroad.







































are the home and foreign producers index, respectively.




















4Two conditions are to be satisﬁed by the utility function. The ﬁrst is the disutility of
work (
δUj








(1 − logLj) < 0, implying that logLj < 1). The assumption k>α
garantees that in equilibrium 0 < logLj < 1 holds (see equation (49)).
5The parameter λ is the price elasticity of demand faced by each monopolist. The inequality
constraint ensure an interior equilibrium with a positive level of output. This relationship will
become apparent later when we solve for the optimal price setting.
























are the home and foreign producers index, respectively.
2.3 Demand side
We assume that the law of one price holds across all individual brands, i.e.
PH(z)=EP∗
H(z) and PF(z)=EP∗
F(z) where E denotes the nominal exchange
rate. Note that the indices (2), (3), (4) and (5) imply that purchasing power
parity also holds across the overall consumption price indices, i.e.
P = EP∗. (6)

































where PH(z) and PF(z) are the home-currency prices for a brand z charged by a
domestic and foreign ﬁrm respectively. Recall that λ>1 captures the elasticity
of substitution among varieties, while the elasticity of substitution between the
domestic and foreign good is equal to one.













































F(z) are the foreign-currency prices charged for a brand z
by a domestic and foreign ﬁrm respectively.
Thus integrating the demand for a particular brand across the home (7) and










where CW ≡ C + C∗ is total consumption in the world economy, C ≡
R γ
0 Cjdj
is the aggregate consumption in the home country and C∗ ≡
R 1
γ Cj∗dj ∗ is the
aggregate consumption in the foreign country.
Similarly, aggregating (8) and (10) across agents, we obtain the total demand













5The current account equilibrium entails that the level of consumption in the
two countries be constant and proportional to the economy dimension6:
C = γCW ; C∗ =( 1− γ)CW. (13)
Each agent in the economy needs cash in advance so as to pay for her nominal
expenses
Mj = PCj ; Mj∗ = P∗Cj∗. (14)
Under these assumptions the nominal exchange rate is proportional to nominal








0 Mjdj and M∗ ≡
R 1
γ Mj∗dj ∗ are total money supply in the home
and foreign country, respectively. By normalizing the previous period nominal
money supply and exchange rate, the current nominal money supplies and the
exchange rate can be expressed as
M =1+m ; M∗ =1+m∗ ; E =1+e
where lower-case letters stand for percentage increases. In the text, the following
approximation of equation (15) is exploited
m = e + m∗ (16)
where m ≈ logM, m∗ ≈ logM∗ and e ≈ logE.
Finally, using (13) and (14), the aggregate-nominal demand (11) in the do-




PH(z)YH(z)dz = M. (17)







F(z)YF(z)dz = M∗. (18)
2.4 Individual budget constraints
To complete the qualiﬁcation of the individual’s problem, we consider the agent’s
budget constraint. Each jth individual draws a salary for the labor type supplied
to ﬁrm z which, in turn, distributes dividends evenly among its owners (all of
the workers). Markets are complete domestically and international equity trade
is forbidden7. Moreover, in order to pay for nominal expenses, cash in advance
is needed. Under these assumptions, the domestic agent’s budget constraint is
Mj ≥ PC j = WjLj(z)+Dj(z) (19)
where Mj are money balances, Wj is the nominal wage and Dj(z) are div-
idends received by ﬁrm z.T h e j∗th agent is subject to a similar budget con-
straint.
6This result is due to the full international risk sharing as in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998)
and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001).
7Given the Cobb-Douglas preferences over home and foreign goods and the separability of
agents’ utility functions, international equity trade would not aﬀect equilibrium outcomes.
62.5 Unions
As said above, labor is supplied in a variety of labor types deﬁned in the interval
(0,1) while each agent provides ﬁrm z only with a speciﬁc labor type. Although
workers can be employed in all industries, they are not perfectly substitute to
workers associated with other unions. In other words labor is diﬀerentiated and
each type i is represented by union i.T h u sajth individual can be associated
with a sole labor union i, i.e. j ∈ i.
The home country is populated by a ﬁnite number of unions, nH.S i n c ea l l
workers are unionized and equally distributed among unions, each union has
mass 1
nH and 1
nF in the home and foreign country respectively. In our setup
the degree of centralization of wage setting (CWS) is proportional to union size
and is higher the smaller the number of independent union bargainers in the
economy.
Note that the smaller is the number of unions, the more relevant is the
impact of their wage settlement on aggregate variables. In this respect the
CWS is directly related to the unions’ capacity to internalize the macroeconomic
consequences of wage variations8.
The representative union is benevolent, i.e. it maximizes the utility of its









We assume that each worker (and the union that represents her) takes proﬁts
as given9. The home (foreign) union sets the same rate of growth of the nominal
wage ωi (ωi∗) among its members so as to maximize its own objective function.
It is convenient to express the nominal wage of worker i, Wi, and the CPI in
the home country as
Wi =1+ωi ; P =1+π,
where π is domestic inﬂation rate10. By the same token the following relations
hold abroad:
Wi∗ =1+ωi∗ ; P∗ =1+π∗.
The benevolent union hypothesis is in line with the trade union behavior
surveyed by Oswald (1982) whose objective function usually includes real wages
and unemployment11.
8Drawing on Guzzo and Velasco (1999) we refer to such capacity as internalization eﬀect.
9Aside from monopoly power, this adds an other distortion introduced in the model. Con-
versely, when we present the CB problem below, the CB will allow for all economy-wide
interactions so as to internalize the eﬀect of D on the welfare of agents.
10The previous period of nominal wage and inﬂa t i o na r en o m a l i z e dt ou n i t yw i t h o u tl o s so f
generality since equilibrium outcome does not depend on it.
11Grüner and Hefeker (1999), Soskice and Inversen (2001), Cukierman and Lippi (2001)
evaluate the macroeconomic eﬀect of monetary uniﬁcation when unions are averse to inﬂation.
However we focus on microeconomic instead of macroeconomic foundations to analyse unions’
behavior.
72.6 Central Banks
Drawing on the literature on time inconsistency in monetary policy, we assume
that the monetary authority is inﬂation averse and cares about the real perfor-
mance in the economy, which in our setup corresponds to agents’ utility12.
In particular under national monetary policies, the domestic and foreign














π∗2 βF ≥ 0. (23)
The parameters βH and βF point out the CB’s degree of conservatism (Rogoﬀ,
1985a). If the level of conservatism is zero the CB becomes a benevolent planner
who cares only about the agents’ welfare.
2.7 Timing structure of the model
In the ﬁrst stage (at time 1), each union chooses the rate of growth of the
nominal wage of its members in a simultaneous game with foreign and the other
domestic unions so as to maximize its objective function (20). Moreover, in
the maximization problem each union anticipates the reaction of the CB and
of ﬁrms to its wage choice. The timing sequence is built on the notion that
nominal wages are substantially more sticky than prices and monetary policy.
The rationale for such an assumption is that workers are normally under contract
for at least a year; thus, wage setters are committed to the bargained wage over
the whole period of the game.
In the second stage (at time 2) the sovereign CB sets the country-speciﬁc
money supply in a simultaneous non-cooperative game with the other mone-
tary authority, taking as given the preset nominal wages and internalizing the
reaction of ﬁrms. Monetary policy is hence stickier than price setting13.
In the last stage (at time 3) each monopolistic competitive ﬁrm sets the
price of its own brand so as to maximize its proﬁt, taking the general price
level, nominal wages and money supply as given14.
The three-stage game between ﬁrms, monetary authorities and labor unions
is solved by backward induction so as to ﬁnd the Nash sub-game perfect equi-
librium.
12The paper investigates how the design of the monetary institution aﬀects the country
p e r f o r m a n c e . T h en o t i o no fa ni n ﬂation averse CB may be interpreted also as a kind of
general institutional constraint in the economy.
13Models with a New Keynesian orientation àl aClarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) suppose
that price setters move ﬁrst than the monetary authority. However, the assumption of prices
stickiness is more debatable than wages stickiness (see Cukierman, 2004).
14Notice that the timing of the game implies no precommitment of the CB. Monetary policy
is hence set in a "discretionary" way. Moreover since ﬁrms are the last to move, prices may
be considered as fully ﬂexible.
83P r i c e s e t t i n g
Henceforth we will focus mainly on the domestic country. However, it is impor-
tant to bear in mind that there is a parallel with the optimization problems in
the foreign country.






















The ﬁrst constraint stems from the cost minimization problem of ﬁrms (see
equation (1)). The second one is the result of the consumer problem derived


























As in the closed economy literature, the price rule is an increasing function
of the real wage and real money balances. However two further eﬀects are at
work in an open economy framework. First, the terms of trade captured by
ratio between the home producers index and the CPI. An increase in the price
of home-produced good improves the terms of trade but reduces the optimal
relative price. This is due to the loss of competitiveness of the home-produced
good and the following shift in the demand. Consumers in both countries switch,
in fact, from the more expensive home good to the cheaper foreign one inducing
ﬁrm to decrease their own brand price in order to keep out of reduction in sales.
Second, the aggregate demand includes also the real balance eﬀect emanating
from the other country. An increase in foreign money supply, in fact, boosts
consumption both for foreign and domestic products.
In a symmetric equilibrium the price of a brand, Pc(z), coincides with the
producer price index, Pc, for all z,w h e r ec ∈ [H,F]. Thus taking the logarithms
of each ﬁrst order condition of domestic and foreign ﬁrms and using (16) yields16
πH − π = α(ω − π)+( 1− α)(m − π) (25)
π∗
F − π∗ = α(ω∗ − π∗)+( 1− α)(m∗ − π∗). (26)
Although prices are fully ﬂexible, they do not completely move when the
money supply changes (equation (25) and (26)). As a matter of fact, it is not
optimal for proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms to respond exactly in kind to the money
supply as long as nominal wages have not been changed. This implies that the
15Coricelli et al. (2000) introduced for the ﬁrst time the optimal price setting in the litera-
ture on nominal wage bargaining systems.
16In deriving the following expression, we neglect the costant αlog λ
(λ−1)α.
9monetary authority may aﬀect real variables, even when prices are fully ﬂexible,
for nominal wages are contractually ﬁxed (Cukierman, 2004).
Arranging equation (25) and (26), we obtain the following negative relation
between real money balances and wages:
m − πH = −
α
1 − α







From the deﬁnition of the CPI (4) and (2) and the exchange rate (16), the
previous equations imply that the general price level can be rewritten in terms
of domestic and foreign wages and money supplies as follows:
π = αγω + m(1 − αγ)+( 1− γ)α(ω∗ − m∗) (29)
π∗ = αγ(ω − m)+( 1− γ)αω∗ + m∗ [1 − α(1 − γ)]. (30)
An accommodating sovereign monetary policy operates in the country through
two channels: on the one hand it expands the demand faced by each monopo-
listic ﬁrm and, on the other hand, it depreciates the exchange rate. Both eﬀects
stimulate price hikes.
The foreign monetary policy has instead two opposing eﬀects: the rise of the
domestic demand and the appreciation of the exchange rate. The latter eﬀect
always prevails so that an increase in foreign money supply reduces domestic
inﬂation.
At this stage domestic and foreign wages aﬀect inﬂation in the country only
through their impact on input costs which in turn determine domestic and for-
eign good prices, respectively. In the following sections we will see that monetary
policies are in turn inﬂuenced by domestic and foreign wage settlements through
strategic interactions.
4I n ﬂation-employment trade-oﬀ
In each country the sovereign CB faces a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and employ-
ment. Let Li and Li∗ indicate the aggregate employment of labor type i and
i∗ in the home and foreign country, respectively. Li is achieved by integrating
(1) across all domestic ﬁrms and using equation (17) which yields the following











Then plugging equation (25) into equation (31) and integrating across all labor







(ωi − ω)di + m − ω. (32)
Now the home Phillips curve is obtained by solving for money supply equation
(32) and substituting it into (29),
π = l(1 − αγ)+α(1 − γ)(ω∗ − m∗)+σ(1 − αγ)
Z 1
0
(ωi − ω)di + ω. (33)
10The slope of the Phillips curve in the home country is hence
dπ
dl
=1− αγ > 0. (34)
An analogous Phillips curve holds in the foreign country,
π∗ = l∗ [1 − α(1 − γ)] + σ[1 − α(1 − γ)]
Z 1
0
(ωi∗ − ω∗)di∗ + ω∗ + αγ(ω − m),
whose slope is
dπ∗
dl∗ =1− α(1 − γ) > 0. (35)
It is apparent that the slope of the Phillips curve is a decreasing function of
the country size. Thus, if the home country is smaller (larger) than the foreign
country, the domestic CB will face a steeper (ﬂatter) Phillips curve.
Intuitively, the impact of money supply on employment is always equal to
one in both country (see equation (32)). Labor market is "isolated" from foreign
variables17. The general level of price is instead aﬀected by both domestic and
foreign variables. An expansionary monetary policy aﬀects both the producer
price index and the exchange rate. Since the CPI is a weighted average of the
domestic and foreign good where the weight coincides with the country size, the
larger is the country size, the "more closed" is its economy. In this context an
accommodating monetary policy plays a less important eﬀect on the CPI level
through the exchange rate channel.
How does a diﬀerent trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and employment aﬀect op-
timal monetary policy? A domestic CB payoﬀ (22) may be rewritten as










= α − kl − βH
dπ
dl
π =0 . (36)
According to equation (36), marginal beneﬁts (ﬁrst two terms) from boosting
employment has to be equal to the marginal cost (last term). Here we clearly see
the role played by the Phillips curve in the CB balances of unemployment and
inﬂation. The weight given to inﬂation depends on the degree of conservatism
and the slope of the Phillips curve. As a matter of fact, both CBC and the
slope of the Phillips curve have the same function: they determine the relative
weight put on inﬂation by the CB.
It is easy to see that, ceteris paribus, the eﬀect of a ﬂatter Phillips curve is
similar to the eﬀect of smaller CBC. The CB will adopt a more accommodating
monetary policy either with a smaller degree of conservatism or a ﬂatter Phillips
curve. In both cases the CB would realize a higher loss from reducing inﬂation
than unemployment18. The following proposition summarizes the main results
achieved so far.
17As a matter of fact we will see below that foreign variables aﬀect domestic employment
strategically through the domestic monetary policy.
18We will see below that, since the CB’s reaction function is common knowledge for labor
unions, workers anticipate the incentive of the CB to inﬂate. In the "time-consistent" equilib-
rium the marginal beneﬁtt oh i g h e ri n ﬂation exactly oﬀsets the marginal cost. The monetary
authority could inﬂate above and beyond the worker (rational) expectations, but it is not in
h e ri n t e r e s tt od os o .
11Proposition 1 The size of a country aﬀects the trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and







dl ), if the home-country size is large (small) over the foreign-country
size. Ceteris paribus, the CB has a stronger (weaker) incentive to inﬂate so as
to achieve higher employment in a big (small) country.
5 Monetary policy
This section examines the optimization problem of the two central banks under
a national monetary policy regime. Both policies take place simultaneously in
the second stage of the game.
5.1 Central bank reaction functions
Each CB chooses its money supply taking as given nominal wages and the
other central money supply so as to maximize (22) under the Phillips curve
investigated in the previous section (33). The two central banks choose money
supply simultaneously as Nash players and act as Stackelberg-follower player
vis-à-vis trade unions (Stackelberg leaders).
Under a national monetary policy regime the ﬁrst order condition of the CB























According to expression (37), as long as the employment level is below the
optimal one20, α
k (see equation (49)), it is optimal for the CB to fuel a positive
inﬂation rate through its monetary policy. By contrast, when employment is
above the competitive level, CB deﬂates the general price level.
Using (36) and (32), we explicitly solve (37) for the domestic money supply
m =
kω + α[1 − βH(ω∗ − m∗ +( m∗ − ω∗ + ω)γ)(1 − αγ)] + σk
R 1
0 (ωi − ω)di
k + βH(1 − αγ)2 .
(38)
Similarly the reaction function of the foreign CB is derived by selecting the
foreign money supply that maximizes (23) and internalizing the ﬁrms’ reaction
functions. This yields the following optimal money supply in the foreign country
m∗ =
kω∗ + α + αβF [1 − α(1 − γ)][(m − ω)γ − (1 − γ)ω∗]+σk
R 1
0 (ωi∗ − ω∗)di∗
k + βF(1 − α(1 − γ))2 .
(39)
Equations (38) and (39) reveal the novelty of the paper: monetary policy
depends both on domestic and foreign labor market aspects and on the monetary
policy in the other country. In the next section we focus on the interaction
between the two CBs.
19Since the CB is a large agent, proﬁts are not taken as given.
20i.e. the level of employment that maximizes the workers’ welfare equating the consump-
tion/leisure marginal rate of substitution (k logL)t ot h e( e ﬃcient) technical rate of transfor-
mation ( 1
α).
12Figure 1: Positively sloped CB reaction functions. Note the values of the para-
meters are α =3 /4,β F =7 ,β H =5 ,γ=1 /2,ω F =1 ,ω H =1 ,n=1 0 ,σ=1 .2
and k =1 .
5.2 Home and foreign monetary policy interaction
Now, under a ﬂoating regime a strategic interaction arises between the domestic
and foreign CB. The domestic monetary expansion raises home agents’ nominal
incomes but depreciates the exchange rate, increasing the home currency price of
foreign goods. As the nominal exchange rate moves one-to-one with the money
supply, the home CPI raises by 1 − αγ (see equation (29)). It follows that
home agents’ income will increase in real terms by αγ expanding the demand
for consumption goods.
The home currency depreciation improves the purchasing power of foreign
agents in real terms by the same amount αγ. Thus, consumption grows symmet-
rically in the two countries. Since the foreign CPI is reduced by the depreciation
i nt h eh o m ec u r r e n c y ,t h ef o r e i g nC Be x p e riences a fall of its marginal cost which
induces to inject money in the system21. It follows that the CBs react to each
other by adapting the money supplies in the same direction. The two CBs’
reaction functions display hence a positive slope (as for example in Figure 1)
which implies the following lemma.
Lemma 2 In an open economy the money balances supplied by two CBs are
strategic complements.
Proof. When foreign CB responds in kind to a more expansionary domestic
monetary policy, m∗ is a strategic complement of m.I t i s s u ﬃcient hence
to evaluate how an increase in domestic (foreign) money balances aﬀects the







k+βF[1−α(1−γ)]2 are both positive.
21Conversely, domestic contraction stimulates foreign tightening in the monetary policy. A
similar mechanism holds mutatis mutandis if foreign CB shocks the economy with a monetary
expansion or contraction.
135.3 Monetary policy and wages under ﬂoating exchange
rate
In an open economy monetary strategic interactions depend also on home and
foreign labor unions. The two CBs’ reaction functions (39) and (38) can be
rewritten in the following reduced form
m = Aω










































It is apparent that the CB’s reaction to wages is induced by a direct impact
on inﬂation and employment and an indirect eﬀect through the other country
monetary policy response22.
Reaction functions of the two CBs are common knowledge among labor
unions. When setting their wages, unions may fear an adverse or favorable
response by the domestic and foreign CB23. In order to facilitate the analysis
of the role played by wages on the monetary policy, we present ﬁrst the direct
eﬀect of wages on employment and inﬂation and secondly the indirect eﬀect of
wages through the other country monetary reaction function. In this respect
each interaction is analyzed without giving way to clarity.
As in Coricelli et al. (2006) the national CB either thwarts or accommo-
dates an increase in national nominal wages. This depends on its degree of
conservatism.







∂ω∗ =0 ), and for values of domestic (foreign) CBC greater
than e βH = k
γα(1−γα) (e βF = k
α(1−γ)[1−α(1−γ)]), the CB contracts its money supply
in response to domestic (foreign) wage hikes, while for values of conservatism
below e βH = k
γα(1−γα) (e βF = k
α(1−γ)[1−α(1−γ)]), the CB accommodates its money
supply.
Proof. It can be immediately demonstrated through (38) and (39) evaluating







Intuitively, an increase in domestic wages fosters both inﬂation (29) and
unemployment (32). The marginal impact on inﬂation is αγ while the marginal
impact on employment is −1. The CB has to oﬀset along the Phillips curve the
increase in the marginal cost due to high inﬂation by the increase in marginal
beneﬁtd u et ol e s se ﬀort. A conservative domestic CB, i.e. βH > k
γα(1−γα),
prefers to reduce inﬂation more than to increase employment by tightening its
money supply. On the contrary, a populist CB, i.e. βH < k
γα(1−γα), desires to
22The impact of wages on money supply is henceforth evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium
(where the terms
U 1
0 (ωi − ω)di and
U 1
0 (ωi∗ − ω∗)di∗ cancel out).
23Cavallari (2004) employs a similar framework but disregards the indirect inﬂuence of
foreign monetary policy on the home wage setting.
14boost employment more than dampen inﬂation. A similar reasoning holds for
the foreign CB mutatis mutandis.
Diﬀerently from the closed economy literature, the monetary policy is af-
fected by the wages prevailing in the other country as well. The wage hikes
in a country in fact spill over into the other country through more expensive
imports (imported inﬂation). Employment conversely is not aﬀected directly by
the variation of wages in the other country. Thus the direct eﬀect on the CB’s
reaction function of a wage rise abroad is described as follows.







∂ω =0 ), the domestic (foreign) CB always counteracts a
foreign (domestic) wages increase.







k+βF[1−α(1−γ)]2 are always negative.
The eﬀect of a ceteris paribus increase in foreign wages raises the marginal
c o s ti nt h ed o m e s t i cC B ’ sﬁrst order condition without having any impact on
the marginal beneﬁt. It results that domestic CB reduces its money supply so
as to abate the higher inﬂation rate.
Drawing on Lemma 3, 4 and 2, we can now calculate the overall elasticity of
the CB monetary response to wages displayed in the matrix (40) at a symmetric




∂m ∈ (0,1). Thus, in order to assess the signs
of the elements of matrix (40), it is suﬃcient to focus on the terms in square
brackets.
The reactions of a CB to wages including direct and indirect eﬀects are
characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (i) The CB’s money response to wage hikes abroad is always
negative. (ii) A conservative (populist) CB always tightens (accommodates) its
monetary policy to national wage hikes.
With an increase in wages in the other country, the direct eﬀect on national
monetary policy is always negative while the indirect eﬀect depends on the
degree of conservatism of the other CB. However the ﬁrst part of Proposition
5 states that, in case of an increase in wages abroad, a domestic CB tightens
its monetary policy despite the foreign CB accommodates24. It follows that
the direct eﬀect of wage through inﬂation always prevails on the indirect eﬀect
through the CB response abroad.
If the two CBs are conservative (populist) both the direct and indirect eﬀect
of national wages have negative (positive) sign, i.e. both eﬀects go in the same
direction. It follows that the elements on the main diagonal of matrix (40) have
unambiguously positive sign if the CBs are populist and negative sign if the CBs
are conservative.
When a CB is populist and the other is conservative, the direct and indirect
eﬀects of national wages on the national money supply are at odds. In such a
case, the second part of Proposition 5 shows that the direct eﬀect always prevails
on the indirect one. Thus, a conservative (populist) CB always counteracts
(accommodates) an increase in wages in its own country in spite of the other
CB behavior.
24Remember that the two monetary policies are strategic complements.


















It is worth noting that
∂μcc
∂βc < 0 and
∂μc−c
∂βc < 0,w h e r e−c stands for the
other country25. The CB accommodates less or counteracts more home and
foreign wage hikes if its degree of conservatism is higher. By the same token,
∂μcc
∂β−c < 0 and
∂μc−c
∂β−c < 0, i.e. the home (foreign) CB accommodates less or
counteracts more home and foreign wage hikes if foreign (home) CB degree of
conservatism is higher.
The explanation is that more foreign CBC prompts more restrictive foreign
monetary policy which depreciates the home currency and reallocates produc-
tion towards the home country. This, in turn, implies an increase in the domestic
CPI and employment. The optimal domestic monetary policy is hence to tighten
its money supply.
6W a g e s e t t i n g
In the ﬁrst stage of the game unions act as Stackelberg leaders vis-à-vis the
monetary authorities, i.e. the labor unions anticipate the reaction functions
of both CBs. In the home country union i chooses the rate of growth of the
nominal wage, ωi, so as to maximize (20) subject to (19) and (40). In doing
that the union takes as given proﬁts, Di, and the nominal wages set by the other
unions at home and abroad. The typical union i ﬁrst order condition is hence26
α(1 − sH − εH)+εHkli =0 , (41)
where sH is the impact eﬀect (elasticity) of ωi on inﬂation when the nominal







[αγ +( 1− αγ)μHH − (1 − γ)αμFH] ∈ (0,1). (42)














Note that equation (43) is a weighted average of the elasticity of substitution
among labor types, σ, and the elasticity of aggregate labor demand, 1 − μHH.
25The elasticities of money supply to nominal wages are expressed in terms of the model
parameters in the Appendix.
26See the Appendix for details.
16Dividing (41) by 1−sH, we can express the ﬁrst order condition in terms of the
real wage elasticity of labor demand, ηH,a sf o l l o w s
α(1 − ηH)+kηHli =0 . (44)
Equation (44) shows that an increase in the union i’s wages has two opposing
eﬀects on the utility of workers: on one hand it reduces consumption (the ﬁrst
term in (44)); on the other hand, it increases utility through leisure (the second
term in (44)). Thus, each union sets a nominal wage growth according to its
consumption/leisure preferences, k.





1 − μHH +( nH − 1)σ
nH − 1+θH(1 − μHH)+( 1− θF)μFH
∈ (1,∞) (45)
where θH ≡ 1 − αγ and θF ≡ 1 − (1 − γ)α.






1 − μFF +( nF − 1)σ


















It is worth noticing that when unions internalize the impact of their wages on
the CB reaction abroad, μc−c, such variable increases the elasticity of labor
demand27.
In the next section we will see how employment and inﬂation are determined
by macroeconomic institutional variables that aﬀect the labor demand elasticity.
7 Equilibrium employment and inﬂation
Since unions are identical, in a symmetric equilibrium li = l for all i =1 ,...,nH










Equation (49) points out that equilibrium employment is an increasing function
of the elasticity of labor demand, ηc. When the elasticity of labor is ﬁnite
(ηc < ∞) unions have some market power28. The smaller is the labor elasticity,
the higher is the unions’ incentive to raise its nominal wages. In fact, a nominal
wage claim sends ripples through employment to a less extent in presence of
27Remember that the elasticities of money supply with respect to nominal wages abroad,
μc−c,a r ea l w a y sn e g a t i v e .
28As in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), equilibrium employment
is at suboptimal level.
17market power29. By contrast, when the elasticity of labor demand goes to
inﬁnity we achieve the competitive (optimal) level of employment α
k.
The general price level in the home country is calculated by plugging equa-
tion (49) into the CB reaction function (37). Assuming a symmetric equilibrium,













It is clear that labor market characteristics play a key role in determining equi-
librium inﬂation as well. In particular, the inﬂation rate is negatively aﬀected
by the elasticity of labor demand. Moreover, equation (50) and (51) indicate an
inﬂation bias. With no precommitment of any kind for the monetary authority,
this is a standard result in the literature on the time inconsistency of monetary
policies. We therefore can state that
Remark 6 The conventional wisdom that discretionary policymaking by the
CB yields an inﬂation bias, while leaving employment at suboptimal levels, still
holds in an open economy when the elasticity of labor demand is ﬁnite.
It is crucial at this point to compare the labor demand elasticity ηH and ηF
so as to assess the impact of macroeconomic institutions on employment and
inﬂation.
Assuming identical number of unions and money supply elasticity with re-
spect to wages in both countries, from equation (42) and (47) it appears that
a nominal wage hike in the home country has more repercussions on inﬂation
the larger is the size of the home country. Clearly, the higher is the weight
put on the domestic good, i.e. γ, the more is the impact of inﬂationary wage
settlements in such a country. Notice that even in the case of a small-country
hypothesis, when γ =0 , domestic unions perceive that they have an impact on
inﬂation.
This result is in sharp contrast with the policy games literature, such as
Coricelli et al. (2004) and Cukierman and Lippi (2001), where in the extreme
case of γ =0unions do not perceive any impact on the inﬂation rate. This
happens because in our model countries are linked through the exchange rate.
Even though unions do not inﬂuence the domestic-produced good, their wage
demands aﬀect the exchange rate and, consequently, the inﬂation. As a matter
of fact unions anticipate the (accommodating) response of the domestic CB
through the depreciation of the exchange rate which, in turn, boosts inﬂation30.
In general, the (negative) response of the foreign CB to domestic-wage hikes
increases inﬂation at home as well. Intuitively, an increase in domestic wages
causes a rise in the domestic-produced good. The foreign country undergoes
an imported inﬂation by consuming the home good. The foreign CB then is
induced to counteract the inﬂationary wage settlement by means of a restrictive
monetary policy. The bigger is the foreign country size, i.e. the weight of the
29The monopolistic nature of the labor market and the eﬀects on employment are in accord
with Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) results.
30Note that when γ =0 , μFH does not aﬀect s.
18foreign-produced good in the home consumption, the stronger is the inﬂuence
of the foreign CB reacting to domestic wage hikes.
However as shown in the Appendix, the elasticities of money supply to nom-
inal wage diﬀer among the two countries. Removing the assumption of equality
renders the framework richer. The labor market structure (i.e. the labor de-
mand elasticity) is in fact ultimately determined by the number of unions and
the elasticity μcc and μc−c (see equation (45) and (46)). Thus, in the follow-
ing section we assess how CBC, CWS and country size may modify the labor
demand elasticity.
7.1 Role of central bank conservatism
How do employment and inﬂation depend on the CBC? Rewriting the labor












it is clear that a higher degree of conservatism has two opposing eﬀects on
labor unions. On the one hand, a non-atomistic wage setter becomes aware of
the fact that an increase in its nominal wages causes higher inﬂation reducing
employment through the CB reaction function (equation (37)). The higher is
the degree of CBC, the more severe are the employment consequences of wage
aggressiveness32. Drawing on Lippi (1999) terminology we refer to it as adverse
output eﬀect.
On the other hand, since a conservative CB leads unions to perceive less the
inﬂationary impact of their wage, they also anticipate the real wage of other
unions to decrease to a lesser extent and, hence, the shift of labor demand
towards cheaper labor types is smaller33.T h i s adverse competition eﬀect en-
courages wage aggressiveness (Lippi, 1999).
Now it may be interesting analyzing the two limit cases of a CB ultra-
populist and ultra-conservative. Letting the CBC go to zero, i.e. assuming that
the CB does not care about inﬂation but only about agents’ utility, we obtain










31The elasticity of labor is obtained by substituting the CB reaction function in terms of
aggregate labor into li,c = −σ(ωi,c − ωc)+lc and diﬀerentiating with respect to ωi,c.
32Formally this can be seen by diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst term of equation




























33Formally this can be seen by diﬀerentiating the second term of equa-























34The values of ηc in the case of an ultra-populist and ultra-conservative CB are derived in
the Appendix.
19When the CB is ultra-populist the strategic interaction channel between trade
unions and CB is halted35.I ns u c hac a s e ,t h ee m p l o y m e n tl e v e li sb e l o wt h e
Pareto eﬃcient one, α
k, and it depends on the degree of substitutability among
labor types. As speciﬁed in section 5, an ultra-populist CB accommodates any
domestic wage hike one-to-one which implies that wage setters can not aﬀect
employment.
The other extreme case of a CB that cares only about inﬂation, i.e. an





















Equation (54) shows that when a CB has inﬂation as overriding objective,
the employment level may be larger or smaller than equation (53). Thus the
idea that an ultra-conservative CB can always restore eﬃciency is rejected. In
general labor demand elasticity and, hence, the macroeconomic consequences of
a conservative CB depends on the monopolistic distortion in the factor market
as summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 (i) For a number of unions n ∈ (1,∞),a ni n c r e a s ei nC B C
raises employment only if σ<
k+β−cθ2
−c
kθc+β−cθ−c(1−α). (ii) If either nc =1or nc →∞ ,
the impact of CBC on employment is nil.
Proof. In the Appendix.
As βc rises, the elasticity of money supply with respect to local wages
switches from positive to negative values. Thus, an increase in CBC reduces
the inﬂationary repercussions of wage settlement and enlarges the unemploy-
ment consequences (as apparent in equations (42), (43)). Since the CBC aﬀects
the ﬁrst term (adverse output eﬀect) of the elasticity of labor demand (52)
positively and the second one (adverse competition eﬀect) negatively, the eﬀect
of CBC on the adverse output eﬀect prevails only if the condition in Proposi-
tion 7 holds. In other words, if labor distortions are sizeable, the i-th union
understands that inﬂation (caused by its nominal wages) reduces employment
by triggering a restrictive monetary policy36. On the contrary, if σ is large,
unions anticipate that a more conservative CB reduces the real wages of their
competitors to a lesser extent yielding wage aggressiveness.
The impact of CWS on employment will be tackled in the next section.
However the second part of Proposition 7 states that monetary policy is neutral
in the case of a single all-encompassing union (nc =1 ) and when unions are
atomistic (nc →∞ ). It is worth noticing that when nc →∞unions do not
perceive wage demands to have any impact on inﬂation (sc =0 ), and when
nc =1wage diﬀerentials are ruled out. In both cases monetary neutrality
arises since unions perceive they can not aﬀect the real wages of the other
unions37. The assumption of non-atomistic and uncoordinated wage setting is
hence crucial when wages are negotiated in nominal terms.
35The CB is assumed to have only one target (employment) and hence the trade-oﬀ between
inﬂation and employment in its optimal monetary policy is prevented.
36Similarly a wage increase is perceived by the i-th union to rise aggregate real wage (cal-
culated by taking account of the producer price index) which dampens its wage demands.
37The source of non-neutrality in policy games is analysed in Acocella and Di Bartolomeo
(2004).
20What about the foreign monetary policy? The CB abroad always counter-
acts domestic wage demands by a restrictive monetary policy which triggers
the depreciation of the domestic exchange rate. This, in turn, boosts inﬂation
further dampening wage claims, since a nominal wage increase ends in a real
wage improvement to a lesser extent. Thus, the higher is the foreign CBC, the
stronger is domestic wage restraint.
Nevertheless, if the domestic CB is ultra-populist or wage setters are atom-
istic, the foreign CB impact on domestic wages fades away. This is because
the strategic interaction between CB and unions is broken and the (negative)
response of the CB abroad to a domestic wage hike is exactly oﬀset by the (pos-
itive) response of the ultra-populist CB at home or is perceived nil by atomistic
wage setters38. The following proposition summarizes the main results in terms
of foreign monetary policy.
Proposition 8 (i) An increase of foreign CBC rises labor demand elasticity
and, consequently, employment. (ii) Foreign CBC does not have any impact on
d o m e s t i ce m p l o y m e n ti np r e s e n c eo fa nu l t r a - p o p u l i s tC Ba th o m eo ra t o m i s t i c
wage setters.
Proof. The sign of (60) is always positive. This proves (i). When one of the
conditions speciﬁed under (ii) holds, the labor demand elasticity ηc shrinks to
σ.T h i sp r o v e s(ii).
It is worth noticing that in presence of coordinated wage setting at a country
level, i.e. nc =1 , domestic monetary policy is neutral but foreign CBC still
aﬀects employment through the CPI.
As to inﬂation, equation (50) and (51) reveal that ceteris paribus the larger is
the country size, the larger is the inﬂation bias. The motive the relative country
size raises inﬂation is the diﬀerent trade-oﬀ between employment and inﬂation
faced by the CB. Since the Phillips curve in a bigger country is ﬂatter, the CB
has stronger incentive to resort to surprise inﬂation (Rogoﬀ, 1985b). Unions
anticipate this inﬂationary inducement and strive to keep CB from modifying
their real wages which culminates in a higher inﬂationary bias. In this respect,
the country size and the proposition 9 explains why the Bundesbank had the
most conservative statute among European countries.
Proposition 9 A higher degree of the CBC, βc,r e d u c e st h ei n ﬂation bias
(dπc
dβc < 0).
Proof. See equation (61).
Contrary to Coricelli et al. (2004) where a higher degree of CBC is always as-
sociated with lower inﬂation and unemployment, a more conservative CB in this
model does curb inﬂation while reduces unemployment only if the adverse out-
put eﬀect is stronger than the adverse competition eﬀect. The diﬀerent upshot
in Coricelli et al. (2004) is mainly due to the absence of labor substitutability
in the production function. Thus, the adverse output eﬀect always dominates
the adverse competition eﬀect and a more inﬂation averse CB makes unions
perceive higher labor demand elasticity, which results in lower real wages.
38When the domestic CB does not care about inﬂation and wage setters are atomistic, the
labor demand elasticity is equal to σ.
21Figure 2: Employment and CBC when adverse competition eﬀect prevails in
the home country.
Now according to Proposition 7 and 8, the impact of national CBC on labor
elasticity depends on the predominance of the adverse output or the competi-
tion eﬀect. Hence, employment will be an increasing function of CBC if the
labor market distortion are high. Since the foreign monetary policy may aﬀect
domestic employment as well, Figure 2 and 3 encapsulate the results of this
section39.
First, the adverse competition eﬀect may prevail (Figure 2). Employment is
therefore a decreasing function of CBC and an ultra-populist CB is the ﬁrst best
for the economy. Second, labor market distortions can be sizeable in the do-
mestic country (Figure 3) and CBC boosts employment. Note that an increase
in the foreign CB boosts employment in the domestic country since it raises
the labor demand elasticity. This implies that for the home country is always
beneﬁcial (in terms of employment) to trade with a country where the CB is
inﬂation-averse as long as the domestic CB is not ultra-populist. Unions under-
stand that ceteris paribus their wage claims have more inﬂationary consequences
with a foreign conservative CB40, yielding wage restraint.
Figure 2 could represent, for instance, the situation of UK where labor mar-
ket distortions are not particularly marked. In such a country it is attractive to
trade with German where the CB has a strong reputation of conservatism.
7.2 Role of centralization of wage setting
What is the eﬀect of the number of unions on employment and inﬂation? Here
we tackle these questions holding constant the degree of CBC so as to focus
only on the degree of CWS.
From equations (45), (49) and (50), union numerosity aﬀects employment
and inﬂation via the elasticity of labor demand, ηc. In particular, an increase in
the labor market elasticity, i.e. in the competitiveness of labor market structure,
diminishes both inﬂation and unemployment.
39Analytically proved in the Appendix. As for the following simulation, we let nc =3 ,
γ =1 /2, k =1and α =3 /4.
40This renders the real wages of other unions more competitive shifting demand towards
cheaper labor.
22Figure 3: Employment and CBC when adverse output eﬀect prevails in the
home country.
Once again the adverse output and competition eﬀect play a fundamental
function in settling the impact of the CWS on macroeconomic outcomes as
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 10 For a given level of CBC, an increase (decrease) in the CWS,





Proof. In the Appendix.
Intuitively, a non-atomistic labor union sets a higher nominal wage for its
members as long as this does not reduce their employment, i.e. if its real aggre-
gate wage does not exceed the real aggregate wage41. Thus, the smaller is the
number of unions, the more each union internalizes the inﬂationary repercus-
sions of their wage claims (internalization eﬀect). On one side, the wage setter
expects a higher inﬂation rate in the wake of an increase in nominal wage and,
hence, less consequences on the aggregate real wage and the aggregate labor
demand. This entails wage aggressiveness. On the other side, a higher level
of centralization lets union anticipate that its own wage demand ﬁnishes in a
higher aggregate nominal wage which, ceteris paribus, raises the real wage. This
second eﬀect discourages wage aggressiveness and is overwhelming if the condi-
tions in Proposition 10 hold, i.e. when monopoly distortions are high enough
so as to lead a large union to perceive an increase in its own nominal wage as a
raise in its real relative wage (Cavallari, 2004).
Now we assess graphically the two conceivable combinations of the adverse
output and competition eﬀect in the home country. Since inﬂation and employ-
ment are monotonic functions of labor demand elasticity, ηc,w ef o c u so nt h e
linkage between this key variable and CWS. In order to control for the domestic
CBC, we assume that the CB is neither conservative nor populist42.
When the adverse output eﬀect is larger than the adverse competition one,
monopoly distortions are relatively high and a more CWS lets unions internalize
41When employment is below the Pareto-eﬃcient level, the welfare gain of a reduction in
employment is lower than the welfare loss of a reduced consumption.




23the unemployment consequences of their wage demand through the CB reaction
function (see equation (52))43. Under such circumstances, labor demand elas-
ticity is decreasing in the number of unions and converging to σ in presence of
atomistic wage setters (as illustrated in Figure 4).
By contrast, if the adverse competition eﬀect is larger than the adverse
output one, a more decentralized wage setting renders unions less aware of their
inﬂationary wage settlement but increases the demand of ﬁrms for cheaper labor.
In such a case, a competition eﬀect would discourage wage aggressiveness to a
larger extent since by assumption is higher than the adverse output (Figures 5).
Figure 4: Labor demand elasticity and CWS when the adverse output eﬀect
prevails and μHH =0 .
The results in this section are in sharp contrast with the U-shaped curve àl a
Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988). In order to have the U-shaped relationship between
the CWS and economic performance three assumptions have to be satisﬁed44:
(a) There exists a monotonic relation between the CWS and the internaliza-
tion eﬀect.
( b )A ni n c r e a s ei nC W Sa l w a y sr e d u c e s competition in the labor market.
(c) In a decentralized wage setting the competition eﬀect prevails on the inter-
nalization one, while under a centralized wage setting is the internalization
eﬀect to be dominant.
Condition (a) always holds in our model, while (b) is met only if the ad-
verse output eﬀect is smaller than the adverse competition one. The union i’s
labor demand elasticity with respect to its wage is an indicator of the degree of
competitiveness in the labor market: an elastic labor demand shrinks monopoly
power in the labor market. As said before, this elasticity can be increasing or
decreasing in the CWS. However, the third assumption (c) is never satisﬁed
since with atomistic wage setters (i.e. monopolistic competition, n →∞ )t h e
labor demand elasticity converges to σ.
43Multinational ﬁrms, for instance, may indirectly promote international wage coordination
menacing to move the production where labor costs are lower (Calmfors, 2001).
44These conditions are pointed out in Guzzo and Velasco (1999).
24Figure 5: Labor demand elasticity and CWS when the adverse competition
eﬀect prevails and μHH =0 .
Figure 6: Home employment and γ when μHH =0 .
7.3 Role of country size
In this section we deal with the impact of the relative country size on the
macroeconomic performance. In doing that we assume that the national CB is
neither conservative or populist, i.e. μcc =0 , so as to control for the domestic
monetary policy.
An increase in country size has two opposing eﬀect. Since the weight of
domestic good in the CPI is higher, the higher is the home size, unions perceive
that a wage hike has a stronger impact on inﬂation while, on the other hand,
the wage restraint exerted by the foreign CB diminishes. As Figure 6 shows the
former eﬀect dominates45. Thus, a rise in the nominal wage turns out to be a
smaller increase in the real wage.
25Figure 7: Home employment, CBC and nH for σ small.
7.4 Interactions between central bank conservatism and
centralization of wage setting
Here we combine the eﬀect of CWS and CBC on employment and inﬂation
relying on the results obtained in the previous sections. As for employment, the
upshots for the home country are shown in Figure 7 and 8.
When σ is small, according to Proposition 7, employment is an increasing
function of CBC as in Figure 7. An inﬂation averse CB is, actually, willing to
contract its money supply so as to create more unemployment in the economy
and reduce inﬂation. Labor unions are aware of the unemployment threat arising
from a conservative CB and hold down their wage demands.
Moreover, for a given level of CBC, employment is always decreasing in the
number of unions which is inversely related to their degree of internalization.
With a single all-encompassing union, employment is maximized independently
of the monetary conservatism. In such a context, it is not necessary to carry out
a monetary contraction threat, for coordinated wage setters fully internalizes the
aggregate labor demand. Note that in the case of monopolistic competition, i.e.
when nc goes to inﬁnity, unions do not internalize at all the macroeconomic
impact of their wage claims on inﬂation and the strategic interactions with the
CB is ruled out46.
Conversely, in Figure 8 labor market distortions are less relevant and a higher
degree of CBC diminishes labor demand elasticity. Since unions are less con-
cerned about the aggregate unemployment consequences of their wage hikes,
they are tempted to set higher nominal wages which, in turn, increase their own
relative real wages. In this case a more conservative CB is particularly costly in
presence of very few unions. In fact, the less is the number of unions, the more
they internalize the real wage gain. For a given level of CBC, we see a sharp
monotonicity between employment and decentralization of the wage bargaining.
Only an ultra-populist CB may nullify the chance of achieving higher real
wages; indeed, when βc =0the level of employment is equal to the ﬁrst best
regardless of the number of unions, so that the monotonic relationship between
employment and the number of unions disappears. Furthermore, the decrease
45Inﬂation has the same pattern of behaviour.
46The labor demand elasticity is in fact equal to σ.
26Figure 8: Home employment, CBC and nH for σ large.
in employment stemming from a greater monetary conservatism is dampened by
the number of unions (the grid becomes ﬂat for large nc). This conforms with
the results in the earlier sections, where CBC does not aﬀect labor elasticity as
nc →∞ .
Next we account for the joint eﬀect of the number of unions and CBC on
t h er a t eo fi n ﬂation. The simulation is contained in Figure 9 and 10.
In both case inﬂation is a decreasing function of the degree of CBC as we
expected. The main diﬀerence is the role played by the CWS with diﬀerent
degrees of σ. When labor market distortion are high, a lower number of unions
may reduce inﬂation while it does not have any impact if substitutability among
labor types is substantial (σ is high). This means that the eﬀect of CBC on
inﬂation seems to be largest (smallest) at very high level of CWS if σ is low
(high).
The reason why inﬂation is not aﬀected by a large number of trade unions
is related to the internalization eﬀect. Atomistic wage setters (nc →∞ )d on o t
perceive to have any impact on inﬂation (see equation (42)). A non-atomistic
union, instead, realizes that an increase in wage aﬀects positively inﬂation trig-
gering the response of the CB. What is key to large unions, however, is that
monetary conservatism may inﬂuence their monopolistic power. In Figure 9
they have high monopoly power and conservatism reduce it by boosting the
elasticity of labor demand. By contrast, in Figure 10 monopoly power is low
and conservatism increase it by diminishing the elasticity of labor demand.
Finally, drawing on the employment analysis, we can consider the joint eﬀect
of the number of unions and CBC on individual welfare. The welfare analysis
vis-à-vis labor market distortion is shown in Figure 11 and 12. The following
proposition summarizes the main results in terms of individual welfare.
Proposition 11 (i) A nationally centralized wage bargaining system maximizes
individual welfare if labor market distortion are sizeable. (ii) In presence of keen
competition in the labor market, an ultra-populist CB or atomistic wage setters
are optimal for the society.
Proof. In the Appendix.
27Figure 9: Home inﬂation, CBC and nH for σ small.
Figure 10: Home inﬂation, CBC and n for σ large.
Figure 11: Home welfare, CBC and nH for large σ.
28Figure 12: Home welfare, CBC and nH for small σ.
The main diﬀerence between the cases depicted in Proposition 11 has to do
with the behavior of welfare and employment. As long as the employment level
is below the optimal one, a rise in employment is welfare augmenting. Hence, if
labor market distortions are sizeable, we know that the smaller is the number
of the unions, the better is employment performance, and, consequently welfare
(see Proposition 10). Conversely, when σ is large, the monopolistic competitive
outcome is optimal and both an ultra-populist CB and atomistic wage setters
can replicate it.
Note that employment level and hence welfare are increasing functions of
labor substitutability, σ. As a matter of fact, the higher is the labor substitution,
the higher is the labor demand elasticity. Thus we know that labor markets
characterized by sizeable distortions will perform worse, in terms of employment
and welfare, than labor markets where such distortions are lower or nil.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper ﬁlls a gap in the literature on strategic interactions between a mon-
etary authority and wage setters by extending the analysis in an open economy.
Under a ﬂoating exchange rate regime, a new channel of interaction is inves-
tigated through two independent CBs. This issue is particularly relevant in
Europe where labor markets are characterized by the presence of large trade
unions and the monetary policy of the ECB is also aﬀected by the Federal
Reserve Bank.
Building on a micro-founded model, we ﬁnd that the two optimal monetary
policies are strategic complements: the CBs react to each other by adapting
the money supplies in the same direction. Moreover foreign monetary pol-
icy is linked to domestic labor market by enlarging labor demand elasticity.
An increase in domestic wages, in fact, spills over into the foreign country as
imported inﬂation. This triggers a tightening monetary policy abroad which
induces a similar policy at home creating further unemployment concern for
domestic labor unions.
Investigating the strategic impact of centralization in wage setting (CWS)
and central bank conservatism (CBC) on economic performance, we ﬁnd that
29the move towards higher level of CWS and CBC may increase employment and
reduce inﬂation if monopoly distortions in the labor market are signiﬁcant. In
such a case, a conservative CB is willing to contract money supply so as to
create more unemployment in the economy and control inﬂation. Labor unions
are aware of the unemployment threat arising from a conservative CB and hold
down their wage demands. Since the number of unions is inversely related to
their degree of internalization of the monetary threat, more centralization will
increase the economic performance.
Conversely, when labor market distortions are less relevant, a higher degree
of CBC diminishes labor demand elasticity. Since unions are less concerned
about the aggregate unemployment consequences of their wage hikes, they are
tempted to set higher nominal wages which, in turn, increase their own relative
real wages. In this case a more conservative CB is particularly costly in presence
of very few unions. In fact, the less is the number of unions, the more they
internalize the real wage gain.
However, the domestic monetary policy can aﬀect the long-run equilibrium
only when unions are large (non-atomistic). This happens because, when wages
are negotiated in an uncoordinated manner, the CBC determines the CB re-
sponse to inﬂationary wage demands. Each union anticipates that the less is
the CB’s aversion to inﬂation, the more an increase in its own nominal wage will
reduce the other unions’ real wages. The change in the other unions’ real wage
due to inﬂation has two eﬀects. On the one hand a lower real wage renders the
other unions’ labor more competitive. On the other hand, an inﬂationary wage
claim aﬀects the economy’s overall production.
A single all-encompassing union and atomistic wage setters may not aﬀect
the other unions’ real wages and hence the strategic interaction with the do-
mestic CB is ruled out. Nevertheless we show that in the case of a single union
operating in the economy, the foreign monetary policy is not neutral. The for-
eign CB in fact can still aﬀect the labor demand elasticity and, consequently, the
employment level. This happens because of the existence of a wedge between
the real wage relevant for ﬁrms (based on the producer price index) and the real
wage relevant for unions (based on the consumer price index).
As for the welfare analysis, the paper shows that a nationally centralized
wage bargaining system always maximizes welfare when labor market are char-
acterized by sizeable distortions. On the contrary, in presence of keen compe-
tition in the labor market, an ultra-populist CB or atomistic wage setters are
optimal for the society.
9A p p e n d i x
Elasticities of money supply to nominal wages. Let θH and θF be the
slope of the Phillips curve under a national monetary policy regime as expressed
in equation (34) and (35) in the home and foreign country respectively. The











47Note that μHH = μFF only if γ =1 /2 and βH = βF.
















































Since both domestic and foreign CBC negatively aﬀects μHH, it can range from
1 to −
αγ
1−α in the case of ultra-populist (when βH → 0) and ultra-conservative
(when βH →∞∧βF →∞ ) CB, respectively. The elasticity of money supply
to nominal wage abroad is instead given by48
μ−cc = −
β−cβcθ−c(1 − θc)θc


























































c)+β−cβcθ−cθc((1 − θc)(1 − θ−c)+θ−cθc)
¤
>
0. As for the case of domestic money elasticity, foreign money elasticity with
respect to domestic wages is negatively aﬀected by the domestic and foreign
CBC. Thus μFH spans the range −
αγ
1−α to 0 in presence of an ultra-conservative
(βH →∞∧βF →∞ )a n dp o p u l i s tC Br e s p e c t i v e l y .
A typical union ﬁrst order condition. The typical union i maximizes (20)
with respect to ωi subject to (19) and (40), taking as given proﬁts, Di, and the
nominal wages set by other unions at home and abroad. Note that individual
union dividend ﬂows are Di = PH
YH
n (1 − α). In a symmetric equilibrium in
which all Di are the same, proﬁt per union is
Di = PHYH(1 − α)=( 1− α)PCi.
From the budget constraint (19), we obtain for all domestic ﬁrms
PCi = WiLi +( 1− α)PCi














48Note that μHF = μFH only if γ =1 /2.














PC i = α. Divid-
ing expression (57) by 1 −
dlogP







Analysis of CBC and macroeconomic outcome. From equation (45) and
(46), it appears that the value of labor demand elasticity is mainly determined
by the elasticity of money supply to nominal wages. According to the degree of
CBC, 1−μcc spans the range 0 and
k+β−cθ2
−c
(1−α)β−cθ−c+kθc i nt h ec a s eo fu l t r a - p o p u l i s t
and ultra-conservative CB respectively. When 1 − μcc =0 , i.e. in presence of
an ultra-liberal domestic CB, the elasticity of labor demand is σ. When the CB

















This proves equation (53) and (54). In general, the sign of
dηc
dβc not only depends
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kβc(1 − θ−c)θ−c(1 − θc)θc [k(nc − 1)σ + ncβcθc]
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¤2 > 0. (60)
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 7 is proved by taking the partial derivative of (49),
































¯ ¯ ¯ <
1 (see footnote (32) and (33)). The second part of Proposition 7 is achieved by
evaluating equation (59) at nc =1and nc →∞ .
Analysis of CSW and macroeconomic outcome. The marginal impact

















32where Z2 ≡ βcθc
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> 0 and the







kθc + β−cθ−c(1 − α)
!
which proves Proposition 10. In order to assess the eﬀect of CWS and get rid
of the impact of domestic CBC, we assume in section 7.2 that the CB is neither








[1 + (nc − 1)σ]
β−cθ−c (ncθ−c − 1+θc)+k(nc − 1+θc)
(62)




Welfare and macroeconomic institutions. It is straightforward to com-























s.to nc ≥ 1 ∧ βc ≥ 0.
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kθc + β−cθ−c(1 − α)
, β>0 ∧ n =1 .



































kθc+β−cθ−c(1−α)). Recall that both an ultra-populist
CB and atomistic wage setters lead the labor demand elasticity to be equal to
σ, i.e. the case of monopolistic competition.
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